Proof of innocence for AI agents in 2026 is a hash-chained security log: every action sealed so that changing one byte of history breaks the whole chain.
It is the ability to prove what an AI agent did on your behalf — which tools it called, what money it moved, what messages it sent. A hash chain seals every action: each entry's fingerprint includes the fingerprint before it, so tampering with any single entry breaks every later link. Try the demo below: simulate actions, tamper with an entry, and watch verification catch the forgery.
When an AI agent acts on your behalf — calling tools, moving money, sending messages — how do you prove what it did? AI agent security logs are the answer: seal every action into a hash chain: each entry's fingerprint includes the fingerprint before it. Change one byte of history, and the whole chain breaks. Try it below.
Each entry stores hash = SHA-256(prev_hash + timestamp + actor + action). The next entry embeds that hash as its prev_hash, so entries are cryptographically linked in order. To forge entry #2 without detection, an attacker would have to recompute every later hash — and in the real product, hashes are also anchored server-side, so even that wouldn't survive.
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crypto.subtle), but there's no server anchoring it. The real Agent Flight Recorder is server-side: hashes are anchored to append-only storage the moment each action happens, so a compromised agent can't rewrite its own history. This page is illustrative, not a certification.
A hash chain links each log entry to the one before it: every entry's fingerprint includes the previous entry's fingerprint. Change one byte of history and the chain breaks — which is exactly what the demo lets you test.
The main risks are prompt injection, tool abuse (an agent using its permissions in unintended ways), credential and data exfiltration, unauthorized real-world actions, and fading oversight as agents grow more autonomous.
When an agent acts on your behalf, tamper-evident logs prove what it did, when, and under whose authority — the evidence you need after an incident. This page is a live demo of the technique.
Use least-privilege permissions, require human approval for irreversible actions, enforce egress allowlists at the network layer rather than in the prompt, keep tamper-evident logs of every agent action, and maintain a working kill switch.